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The energy markets and the commodity markets in general,
given their complexity and rapid transformation, are often vulnerable to market manipulation. Nobody can deny this given our recent experience with the U.S. Western energy markets crisis of a
few years ago.
What is more important is to recognize that the nature of market
manipulation evolves and mutates over time as the energy markets
become more complex. In the past, market manipulation was typically associated with squeezes, corners, and withholding of physical
supplies from the market. Today market manipulation can be accomplished in many different ways by taking advantage of a variety of trading platforms and leverage offered by derivative instruments. A typical scheme evolves around taking positions on different trading platforms, platforms that often receive different levels of regulatory scrutiny.
Subsequently, a potential manipulator may engage in bursts of
rapid fire trading in one market around specific contract expiration
time when market liquidity dries up in order to influence the prices
used for settlements of outstanding contracts on other platforms
and in other markets. The losses incurred through such trading
would be typically offset by gains on the positions taken on other
platforms and other instruments.
Also, a potential manipulator can use different platforms to decompose a scheme into different pieces and the regulators, who can
see only one part of the bigger scheme, will not detect the manipulation in time.
I am getting close to my time limit so I shall briefly summarize
the recommendations I would like to make. In my view, the efficiency and transparency of the U.S. energy markets can be increased without sacrificing the risk-taking culture and the spirit of
innovation. The critical element of the market reform is, in my
view, an improved access to information. Such initiatives may be
initially opposed by many market participants but in the long run
the industry will benefit from them. Less opaque, more transparent
markets will grow and flourish in the long run, as evidenced by
many other examples.
My recommendations include regular reports of large transactions executed in the OTC markets; elimination of the Enron exemption; regular reports of trading activity on the ICE exchange
available to the trading community.
Thank you. I will be glad to answer any questions.
Senator LEVIN. Thank you very much, Professor Kaminski.
Professor Greenberger.
TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL GREENBERGER,1 LAW SCHOOL PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND SCHOOL OF LAW, BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

Mr. GREENBERGER. Good afternoon and thank you for inviting
me to the hearing. I would submit my testimony.
I really wanted to cut to the chase on this. I am more than happy
to answer questions. You have asked excellent questions of the
prior panel.
1 The
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Senator Klobuchar, who is on the other side of this?
Senator MCCASKILL. McCaskill, but that is OK.
Senator LEVIN. McCaskill.
Mr. GREENBERGER. McCaskill, I am sorry. Senator McCaskill.
Senator MCCASKILL. We get mistaken all the time. It is OK.
Mr. GREENBERGER. It is interesting that you are from Missouri
because you should be talking to Congressman Graves, who got the
Enron loophole largely undone on a floor vote on the House of Representatives when the Republicans controlled the House and natural gas was at $14 per million BTU. It is at $7 today. Why did
he do that? Because the farmers of Missouri were dependant on
natural gas and were dying on the vine, paying $14.
Who is on the other side of this? Go look at the advisory committees that the CFTC sets up to advise them. You are not going to
find the prior panelists on those advisory committees. You are not
going to find your constituents who are paying 35 percent of their
income from natural gas. Go down the list. It is Goldman Sachs.
It is Morgan Stanley.
The CFTC is a captive of the industry it regulates. There is just
no doubt about it. And I am under oath and I take that position.
When Mr. Cicio went to the CFTC in June 2005 to talk about
the Inter Continental Exchange and the question of whether they
should continue to be regulated as a United Kingdom company,
which for purposes of crude oil they are, Osama bin Laden could
not have been treated any worse by the CFTC because that was a
consumer voice coming in to an agency that is dominated by the
International Swaps Dealers and Derivatives Association, the Futures Industry Association, the Securities Industry Association, the
Bond Market Association, and I could go on.
And Senator McCaskill, you will meet those people believe me,
if you want to do away with the Enron loophole. And they will give
you every reason under the sun not to do it.
Amaranth. Nobody got burned besides the investors of Amaranth. Well, your prior panel made it clear and your constituents
are telling you that they got burned. People locked in to prices that
were artificially high in the summer of 2006 and turned around
and the spot price was at least one-third lower than what they had
to charge their consumers.
If you talk to people like the New England Fuel Institute, these
are small businessman. When you ask them what is the global impact that is going to be, that is not what they are dealing with.
And I will tell you what the global impact is going to be. But their
consumers are furious with them. And they are not controlling this
situation. They are trying to hedge.
Yes, you need speculators in this market. The markets could not
function without speculation. But these are not casinos. Amaranth
turned it into a casino. If you want to have gambling, go to Las
Vegas.
This is for a commercial purpose to allow farmers and producers
to hedge and the speculators are invited in to create liquidity. And
the statute, because of the farmers who were taken to the cleaners
by the Chicago Board of Trade at the turn of the 20th Century, the
farmers were the ones who insisted there be no excessive speculation.
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And by the way, the Enron loophole does not apply to the agricultural interests. If it did, you have wheat producers here complaining about what is happening on these markets. And the farmers are too smart and too vigorous to allow this to happen to them.
Agriculture remains completely under the control of the CFTC.
Now with regard to people going over to London, the Inter Continental Exchange bought the British International Petroleum Exchange. And with that fig leaf, they present themselves as a U.K.
company. And they want to take advantage of that.
But are they going and buying up London exchanges? No. They
have just made a $12 billion bid for the Chicago Board of Trade.
They bought the New York Board of Trade. They want to do business in the United States. These kinds of contracts are not—you
cannot go to Dubai and hedge for natural gas that is going to be
delivered in the United States. The United States is the industry
here. ICE is dying. They want to take over the Chicago Board of
Trade. They do not want to go to London.
The Enron loophole, if I might just conclude, Alan Greenspan,
Secretary Summers, Chairmen Levitt and Rainer, the Chair of the
CFTC, each told Congress do not pass the Enron loophole. The
market is too much subject to manipulation. The House did not
pass it. How did the Enron loophole get here? It was introduced in
cover of darkness. It suddenly appeared.
And Senators Feinstein and Cantwell, after seeing the manipulation caused by EnronOnline, raising the price of electricity $40 billion for the consumers of California, ask them about these exchanges and what impact they do. You will hear their answer and
you will hear Amaranth’s people, they have an economist today
who has testified in 83 different proceedings. I counted them. Your
constituents do not have an expert who has testified in 83 different
proceedings. You are the expert.
Yes, there should be speculation. There should not be excessive
speculation. If you are worried about prosecution, cut it off in the
beginning the way NYMEX tried. NYMEX told them do not go
afar. We do not know what this is going to do, but you are going
to cause a dysfunction in the market. Stop. That was not prosecution. That was prescriptive regulation that avoided prosecution.
This can be stopped in a flash.
And finally, with regard to bilateral, that is a very dangerous
word, bilateral. Because EnronOnline, which needed the Enron exemption—by the way, Enron predefunctness set up their
EnronOnline before they got the Enron exemption, they were so
confident they were going to get it. It was grossly illegal and criminal but they had it running.
And by the way, when you look at this report and see who the
Amaranth traders were, they were old Enron officials, traders rather. They brought Enron on. And Amaranth may have gone, Brian
Hunter took home $75 million the year before the collapse. He does
not have to give that back. And the next time we have a crisis like
this, you are going to find the Amaranth traders have been hired
by somebody else.
Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Professor, very much. Thank you
both for your testimony.
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Let us get to the point—we have tried very hard, some of us, to
close the Enron loophole. We had a vote on it on the floor. We were
not able to persuade our colleagues. We limited it at that time to
the electronic exchanges, to add the electronic exchanges to
NYMEX. We thought we could get that done. We have been unable
to get that done.
If that is all we can do this, does that do the job? If we could
cover the electronic exchanges, does that do the job?
Mr. KAMINSKI. Probably not. In my view, it is necessary to put
in place reporting requirements for the OTC transactions which are
typically arranged by the voice brokers. It is a challenging task because, unlike the NYMEX and ICE transactions, many OTC transactions are highly structured and nonstandardized. And also, in
many cases, they extend over longer time periods and contain proprietary information.
But at the end of the day any trading corporation has to summarize the positions. They have to know how many MMBtus they sold
or bought, what is the position, what is the tenor of the positions.
If they do not have this information, they should not be in the business.
And this information can be aggregated, summarized, and reported. I do not see any technical challenges related to it?
Senator LEVIN. There is no technical challenge to getting to the
whole over-the-counter market? Is that what you are saying?
Mr. KAMINSKI. Yes.
Senator LEVIN. You agree with that, Professor Greenberger?
Mr. GREENBERGER. My own personal view is, and it is not based
on any scientific study, is I think the voice brokers play such a
small role in this. If voice brokering was OK, you would not have
ICE and you would not have had EnronOnline. I sat in meetings
with people when the CFMA was discussed and people from Goldman Sachs and the financial markets said, oh my God, you are
going to make us do things by voice brokerage? That takes time.
I am one call. I want to go to a computer screen and press a button.
If I could just interrupt, Senator Levin, they call that bilateral
trading because it is bilateral. They have entered into an agreement by pressing a button. That is multilateral trading. That must
be covered and can be covered and should be and would be covered
if the Enron loophole were eliminated.
Senator LEVIN. So that you basically believe we could technically
write a law which would cover the trading which you just described
if it were described by either electronic or by size?
Mr. GREENBERGER. Yes. The technical word has already been
multilateral transaction execution facility. And you must be careful
because the industry will come to you and say oh no, what we are
doing is bilateral. But you want to look in what they are doing.
Senator LEVIN. I understand. But now if we are able to finally
get the regulators into that area, will there be a move to true bilateral trading? Or is that so impractical for the traders that they will
not move to a true bilateral trade?
Professor Kaminski.
Mr. KAMINSKI. I agree with my colleague. The days of market
based on voice brokers are probably counted. The markets across
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the world are moving to electronic trading. And even if we have an
initial reaction and some migration of trading from the electronic
exchanges like ICE back to the broker market, it will not last long.
Senator LEVIN. And you agree with that, Professor Greenberger?
Mr. GREENBERGER. Yes, absolutely. You want to get to the multilateral computerized trading.
Senator LEVIN. And you have no concern that if we cover that,
there will be a return to the true bilateral voice brokering? That
is not a concern?
Mr. GREENBERGER. That is not a concern and my own view is it
would be impractical to try and reach the bilateral voice brokering.
Senator LEVIN. Now who is going to be the enforcer? Who is the
regulator here? Is it CFTC through NYMEX and through ICE?
Mr. GREENBERGER. The important point that I think has been
lost in all of this is that each exchange, once they are regulated by
the CFTC, is a self regulatory organization. They are the front line
of protecting the consumer. The CFTC cannot do it all.
Senator LEVIN. Can ICE do it?
Mr. GREENBERGER. Yes, absolutely. But they are not required to
right now.
Senator LEVIN. And who is going to do the multilateral trading
regulation?
Mr. GREENBERGER. In that case you are quite correct, there
would not be a self regulatory organization. But the multilateral
transaction execution facility would report directly to the CFTC, as
EnronOnline would have had they not achieved this still-of-thenight exemption.
Senator LEVIN. So they would report to the CFTC. Do you agree
with that?
Mr. KAMINSKI. Yes, I do.
Senator LEVIN. Now, that then puts at least that part of the
trading into the hands of an organization that you say is captured
or owned by the people who are being regulated. Is that a problem?
Mr. GREENBERGER. Well, as I understand it—I may have misread
things. But on Thursday there is a confirmation hearing for two
commissioners. One of them is a former lobbyist for the International Swaps Dealers and Derivatives Association.
I do not know this is a fact, but I would bet that person has written more testimony in opposition to taking down EnronOnline than
any person in the United States.
Senator LEVIN. I am not disagreeing or agreeing with you.
Mr. GREENBERGER. And she is being paired with a former aide
of Senator Daschle, and that is the way it is done. But there are
three vacancies on this commission, including the chair.
Senator LEVIN. I am not agreeing or disagreeing with your point,
in terms of controlling CFTC. I am simply saying if that continues,
then would there be a problem in relying on CFTC regulating that
part of the market which is not self-regulating?
Mr. GREENBERGER. I think with Congressional direction, and I
think you are seeing a little bit on that what happened Friday
afternoon with this new proposed rule, with Congressional direction, the CFTC would be responsive. And I think in terms of oversight—and I know that is not your function, if the CFTC could be
encouraged to welcome the people like who were on the former
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panel and put them on their advisory committees so they have a
voice in the regulatory process, I do believe that eliminating the
loophole with good Congressional oversight the CFTC could handle
this.
Senator LEVIN. Have you had a chance to read our entire report,
either or both of you?
Mr. GREENBERGER. I have.
Senator LEVIN. Have you Mr. Kaminski?
Mr. KAMINSKI. No, I started reading the report last night on the
plane. I read about 40 percent of the report and so far I agreed
with practically every statement contained in the report.
Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Professor Greenberger, could you give
us reaction to the report?
Mr. GREENBERGER. I have worked in this area for 10 years. And
what comes a close second to this report is the report that was put
out under Senator Coleman’s auspices a year ago dealing with the
crude oil industry. This report had the advantage of market data.
Leaving aside where it comes out, it is the most full complete report giving you a major understanding of the markets, the need for
hedging, the role of speculation, the problem with excessive speculation, and the way the statute works. I think is a first-rate piece
of work and the Subcommittee is to be congratulated.
Senator LEVIN. We and our staff thank you both for those comments.
Now, let me go on to the final question that I have, and this has
to do with that chart we had up there before.
There was a direct order to Amaranth to reduce its holdings. And
the reason for that order was that the NYMEX saw a danger in
what was about to happen. It was preventive.
Would you agree that we have got to act in order to prevent
harm? And that it is not enough to simply rely on the manipulation
provisions of law, which then punish actions that have taken place?
Would you agree with that?
Mr. GREENBERGER. Absolutely.
Mr. KAMINSKI. Yes, I fully agree with this. The problem is that
one could argue that there is no problem with excessive market
manipulation and speculation if the losses are limited to a group
of highly sophisticated investors who should know better when they
invest in the hedge funds.
The problem is that in a market economy prices have consequences. And if prices are distorted through excessive speculation, this has a systemic impact on the markets. And I worry not
so much about this unfortunate incident. I worry more about the
systemic impact the excessive speculation will have on the future
of the energy markets. This would be a greater concern to me than
the specific case of consumers overpaying for natural gas last winter.
Senator LEVIN. I did have an additional question. That is, the
CFTC rule last week, and whether or not by requiring traders on
regulated exchanges to disclose their holdings on the unregulated
markets, whether or not that goes anywhere close to what we are
talking about here.
Mr. GREENBERGER. It goes a little bit of the way but not the
whole way. For one thing, I am sure what the CFTC is saying to
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people now is they are getting data that they are required to get
from NYMEX. ICE has ‘‘voluntarily’’ agreed to give them data.
What are they going to do with the data? They have got to have
some standard. And the standard is excessive speculation. Congress has to tell the CFTC, you can deal with expressive speculation on ICE and multilateral exchanges like ICE, and what is excessive speculation.
Look, bookies even stop taking bets at some point because they
are worried about what is going to happen. NYMEX stopped taking
bets not because NYMEX was worried about the consumer interest.
This was all done on borrowed money. Using a contract, you only
put down 10 percent of the funds. Banks are funding the rest.
Clearinghouses are guaranteeing the banks.
What NYMEX was worried about was Amaranth was going to
fail and their clearing function would collapse.
So there is an economic measure here that needs to be followed.
Clearly eliminating the Enron loophole would bring ICE into the
measure. No prosecution, no enforcement. Just when you get to a
certain level, thank you, you have provided liquidity to the market.
Now you have to step back. Which is what NYMEX told Amaranth.
It would have been in Amaranth’s best interest to step back.
Senator LEVIN. It is going to take some direction from Congress.
It is not enough that the information simply be available, that it
is going to take the removal of the Enron loophole essentially, if
we are going to cure this problem. You both agree with that?
Mr. GREENBERGER. Yes.
Mr. KAMINSKI. I do.
Mr. GREENBERGER. One other point about that rule is it does not
require—NYMEX can get information about a trader under that
rule, what the person is doing on ICE. If the person says hey, like
Amaranth said, I do not want to get into this regulatory thing. I
am just going to trade on ICE, that rule does not call for the information to be gathered. It only helps NYMEX. It does not help the
regulator or the policymaker understand if all of the traders decide
to do what Amaranth did and go to ICE. It does not affect that
trading.
Senator LEVIN. It is only if they decide to continue on NYMEX
that they would be covered.
Mr. GREENBERGER. Exactly.
Senator LEVIN. Senator Coleman.
Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Professor Kaminski, I appreciate your reflections on systemic impact. And certainly the first panel’s discussion talked about systemic impact. It is not just the traders who are impacted.
We have had a lot of discussion about excessive speculation. To
both of you gentlemen, how difficult is it to define that? Is this accepted? And who does that? Is this something that Congress does?
Can we leave it to the CFTC? Both of you gentlemen, Professor
Kaminski.
Mr. KAMINSKI. Yes. It is very difficult to define excessive speculation and the term itself is a bit fuzzy and ambiguous. I would identify three or four different types of players in the energy markets.
We have pure speculators and they are critical to the process because they provide the necessary lubrication to the process.

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

14:27 Jan 25, 2008

Jkt 036616

PO 00000

Frm 00046

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

P:\DOCS\36616.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

39
We have big market makers and the financial institutions which
take proprietary positions and in this sense they speculate. But
they also offer the risk management tools to the producers and consumers of energy. And they are a critical component of the system
because they help to reduce the risk to those participants in the industry who are risk averse.
And finally, we have producers and consumers of energy who are
interested in reducing somewhat the returns they get in return for
reduction in risk.
My long-term concern is that the natural hedgers, the producers
and end-users of energy, will depart this market if they are scared
by excessive speculation. And we already have a lot of evidence
that this is taking place.
Senator COLEMAN. Professor Greenberger.
Mr. GREENBERGER. I think you do not have to define it. I think
you can give guidance. I think the CFTC can do it by rule. And the
assurance here is NYMEX had already done it. They had accountability rules. That is what led NYMEX to tell Amaranth to stop.
This is not rocket science. This can easily be done.
Do not forget a large trader is someone who trades 200 contracts.
Amaranth had 100,000 contracts. As Mr. Cicio said, all of the contracts on NYMEX for the contract month he is talking about, by
everybody buying contracts on NYMEX for the month he referred
to is 90,000. Somewhere we can come to an agreement where speculation is good but you cross a line.
This is the kind of thing financial regulatory agencies do every
day, capital rule requirements, what have you. You pick a figure
based on guidance from Congress.
Senator COLEMAN. Professor Greenberger, you raise questions
about CFTC that are not just legislative direction issues or regulation issues. It goes to basic structure, mindset.
Mr. GREENBERGER. That is correct. And I think there is a great
opportunity for the U.S. Senate to put the right consumer oriented
mindset. You have three vacancies coming up. It has been traditional that anybody who supports the industry gets passed on the
Senate floor by a voice vote with no discussion. Senator Feinstein
went to the floor in the last hours of the 109th Congress to stop
the lobbyist from ISDA because she knows what ISDA’s concept did
to the electricity payers in California.
You have got three vacancies now. This is a great opportunity to
reshape that agency.
Are there going to be industrial consumers represented in the
Commission? Are there going to be regular consumers in the Commission? Are there going to be academics? Today, if the Financial
Industry Association, the International Swaps Dealers Association,
and the Bond Market Association give their blessing, the history
has been the person goes through.
And even Republican commissioners, Joe Dial being the most famous, a former Texas Ranger, policeman not baseball player, and
good friend of Phil Gramm from Texas was held on the floor of the
Senate because he dared to question practices in the Chicago Board
of Trade.
If you represent the consumer, you get stopped. If you are helping the banks, you sail right through. You have got to put a stop
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to that. These people who testified in the first panel and your constituents deserve representation. And if not representation, a majority interest in what the CFTC does.
It is no longer a backwater agency. This hearing shows that.
Hundreds of millions of dollars are at stake, hundreds of millions
and billions out of consumers’ pockets.
If you let this sail through thinking it is some backwater agency,
your constituents are going to pay through the nose and the Brian
Hunter’s of this world are going to take home $75 million a year.
Senator COLEMAN. Could you talk a little bit about financing regulation? There was some discussion about user fees a little while
ago. I would be interested in your perspective.
Is there a point at which those user fees, in fact, drive folks to
other markets? Is this something we should be concerned about?
Mr. GREENBERGER. There are user fees in every market except
the futures market. I think user fees, let me tell you, if you try and
put user fees in the CFTC, you are going to hear who the other
side of the common sense because it will eliminate silk linings in
suit jackets if they have to pay those user fees.
But I think user fees should be explored. I have not thought it
through very carefully. There is no reason the U.S. public should
have to pay to make sure that Brian Hunter keeps his trading limited to speculation as opposed to excessive speculation.
Senator COLEMAN. Do you have any concerns, Professor, about
any shifting to opaque markets, any shifting to the bilateral or
non-electronic markets? Is your sense that those are either small
percentages or not practical questions?
Mr. GREENBERGER. I sat and heard people from Goldman Sachs
tell me 10 years ago, voice brokering is a dying art. It is still done
but that is not the way you make your silk lining in your suits. I
am not worried about that.
And I think ICE is the primary example. They portray themselves, even though they are in Atlanta and even though the investment banks own large portions of it, U.S. investment banks,
even though they are trying to buy Chicago Board of Trade, they
can say to themselves we are going to go to London. They are not
going to London. This is where, these markets are where things are
being done.
I remember the Chicago Mercantile Exchange had a contract
that paid off depending on what the interest rates that Russian
banks paid. You won if you guessed right, you lost money if you
guessed wrong. And they called up one day and said guess what,
the Russian banks are meeting before the contracts closed and they
are lowering their interest rates for a day. So that when the contract has to get paid, the interest rate drops, then the contract expires, they go back and meet and raise it again.
Do you think people are going to trade natural gas contracts in
Russia? No.
Senator COLEMAN. Professor Kaminski, you have talked about a
globalized market. You have raised concerns about balkanized regulatory infrastructure. Can you talk a little bit about the offshore
markets, about the bilaterals and something that we should be concerned about as we move forward?
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Mr. KAMINSKI. I do not believe that any responsible corporate entity will move to migrate to trading on an exchange established in
a banana republic. The U.S. market is too big and too important
and too sophisticated to really lose the business to other trading
platforms.
If this happens, the business will go to the countries which have
a regulatory infrastructure which is similar to ours if not more
complete. The regulatory institutions in those countries, like for example FSA in the U.K. will cooperate with the U.S. Federal agencies.
So I do not see a big danger in U.S. energy trading, energy exchanges losing business in the long run to other platforms. If this
happens, it will be more—it will happen on a relative basis and
will be just a manifestation of the fact that other markets outside
the United States are growing and catching up.
So the U.S. market is not going to shrink in size. It will continue
to grow. It may be relatively smaller compared to other markets
but it will not go away.
Senator COLEMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Senator McCaskill.
Senator MCCASKILL. Professor Kaminski, in your testimony I
looked at your written testimony, and you talked about the various
aspects of manipulation. The second one you talked about was the
aggressive rapid and large volume trading near the expiration of
a contract talking about the excessive speculation, which we have
talked about at some length at this hearing today.
The first one that you talked about, however, was the exploitation of market power control by the control of physical assets or
physical supply. I would like both of you to address what, if anything, can be done in that area by Congress?
It is interesting to me because most businesses there is an incentive to invest in the capital infrastructure. There is a bottom-line
business incentive to keep the infrastructure strong, to keep the
capital investment at peak performance.
The irony is in this area there is a disincentive because if you
can fig leaf a lack of supply because of a problem with the delivery
in terms of the capital infrastructure, then it is a way that you can,
in fact, manipulate the market to your advantage.
What, if anything, can we do in terms of that manipulation issue
as it relates to market control of the physical assets and then
therefore of the physical supply?
Mr. KAMINSKI. Well, one fact to be recognized is that the energy
market is global integrated. But at the same time there are local
pockets of market power which have been due to the rigidities and
imperfections of the physical infrastructure.
And often at the specific trading location, far away from NYMEX
and ICE, is a company which is relatively small in size can establish a dominating position because it controls the transmission
lines or it controls the pipelines in a given region and takes advantage of the fact that it dominates a local market. And then it may
engage in very similar strategies, taking positions in the derivatives and trading high volumes in the physical markets to influence
the benchmarks which are used for settlement, cash settlement of
derivative transactions.
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Senator MCCASKILL. What can we do in Congress to address that
kind of manipulation?
Mr. KAMINSKI. Information and information again. Just reporting
the positions taken in the OTC markets and on ICE will preclude
it, because this form of manipulation happens typically outside
NYMEX, happens through the OTC markets, and happens through
the ICE.
Senator MCCASKILL. So the prescription for the second kind of
manipulation will also cure the first kind?
Mr. KAMINSKI. In my view it will go a long way to address this
problem.
Senator MCCASKILL. You both have kind of addressed this, and
that is that the attractiveness of our market, in fact, is due to the
regulation, which is not what you hear from people who are working against regulation. You hear oh, if we regulate, they are going
to run off someplace else.
But essentially what both of you are saying with your expertise
in this area is that it is the certainty that regulation provides that
is the magnet for the investment in this regard because people
know it is not going to be a fixed house. Is that a fair way of summarizing your position on that issue?
Mr. GREENBERGER. Certainly in the financial area that is absolutely true. The proof in the pudding is after this report came out
today, NYMEX started putting out press releases saying you want
to invest securely, invest in a regulated exchange. Yes, that is the
answer.
When Long Term Capital Management failed, the Chicago exchanges put out a full-page ad in all of the financial newspapers
saying this would have never happened if this trading had happened on the Chicago Board of Trade or the Chicago Merc.
And yes, you do not want having indices arbitraged in advance
of payments on these contracts like it happened in Russia with
their bank thing. That would not happen in the United States,
even with the most minimal regulation. Good regulation does attract interest.
I would also say, with regard to the IPOs going over to Europe,
I would look at the percentage U.S. investment banks take to put
out an IPO. I think it is 7 percent versus 4 percent in Europe. That
may have a big explanation why IPOs are being done in Europe.
Senator MCCASKILL. As opposed to it is a less stringent regulatory environment?
Mr. GREENBERGER. Absolutely. And the other point is, about this
arbitrage, potentially Congress passes a law, does things strictly.
There is something called the International Organization of Security Commissions. And by and large, I remember when Long Term
Capital failed, they put out a report about what needed to be done
to control hedge funds. Many of the securities commissions want to
look to the United States for how to regulate effectively, and on
their own adopt procedures to try and stop these malpractices from
happening.
Now they do not have somebody buying 100,000 contracts over
there. They have not been exposed to this kind of massive excessive
speculation, if not manipulation. But they would be very sympathetic to the kind of discussion that you are having here today.
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Senator MCCASKILL. Let me finally address the comments you
made, Professor Greenberger, about the CFTC and the oversight
function that it has or has not based on the compilation of the
board. I will tell you that it was fascinating to me maybe last week
or the week before when we had a hearing in the Commerce Committee with the FCC. The commissioner from the FCC said well,
the reason that they have not acted on this, if we can just talk the
next panel into all agreeing, they would probably move forward. Of
course, the next panel were all the industry players.
It was an absolute confession in a Senate hearing that the FCC
was not capable of acting unless all of the people making money
could, in fact, join hands and agree.
Are you saying that the CFTC has that same kind of dynamic,
that they are dependent upon agreement of the big financial players in this area in order for them to do what they need to be doing
right now?
Mr. GREENBERGER. I am going to be very candid with you, it is
worse than that. It is a very small agency. It started out as an agricultural agency. And all of a sudden Goldman Sachs, Morgan
Stanley, J.P. Morgan Chase, Bank of America, and all of these
prominent people walked in the door and essentially unless you
watch what happens, they take over.
If you look at the Wall Street Journal, I think it was December
13, 2001, there is a story there which I believe the protagonist
agreed to where a lawyer from Sullivan and Cromwell called the
commissioner over to the Washington, DC office of Sullivan and
Cromwell and instructed that commissioner on how he should vote.
Now that would not happen at the FCC. It would not happen at
the SEC. By the way, the commissioner came back and reported it
immediately, and so maybe it did not happen at the CFTC either.
But the fact that they thought that they could do that——
Senator MCCASKILL. They could.
Mr. GREENBERGER [continuing]. And by and large if somebody
from Goldman Sachs or the Managed Funds Association, which is
the industry association for hedge funds, needs an appointment
with a commissioner my experience was, in the 2 years I was there,
the appointment happens that day.
By the way, there is a lot of talk about the fact that the CFTC
should be part of the SEC because a lot of these instruments it is
hard to tell whether they are futures, derivatives, or securities. So
why have a fight over it? Let us put them all in one——
Senator MCCASKILL. Put them all one place.
Mr. GREENBERGER. But I will tell you something, the people I am
talking about do not want that to happen because they know that
even with the present SEC that some people may think is more
laissez-faire than traditional, they are not going to be able to say
jump and hear the question back how high.
Senator MCCASKILL. Professor Kaminski, do you think it would
be a good idea to move the CFTC under the SEC?
Mr. KAMINSKI. I did not think about it. Given the growing integration of the U.S. financial markets, it definitely makes sense to
improve coordination between different agencies, including FERC,
SEC, and CFTC. Whether it makes sense to create one big institution, regulatory institution, regulating all the markets, looking at
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all the markets, I have not been thinking about it so I cannot give
you an informed opinion.
Senator MCCASKILL. I would welcome both of your comments
about both a user fee structure so that we are getting the vig that
we need to run the place.
And second, whatever thoughts you have about if, in fact, due to
the changing and evolving financial transactions as it relates to
these kinds of products, particularly in light of the global nature
and electronic transactions, if it does make sense for all of this to
be under the umbrella of one regulatory realization as opposed to
being split up the way it is. I would appreciate your input on that.
Finally, I will just say that the biggest enemy we have here is
complexity. Invariably the public can be the best lobbyist in the
world, if they are aware, informed and understand. Unfortunately
in this area this is so complex that most people do not understand
the relationship between what they are paying on their gas bill and
hedge funds and the speculative market. And frankly, until 2 days
ago, I had no idea what ICE even was. I did not even understand
ICE.
To the extent that you all can present the view of consumers
from a very educated position is invaluable to this Subcommittee.
I only wish that you could, in fact, multiply and fan out throughout
the capitol and begin to do one-on-one visits with all the senators
that have votes because I can assure you the other side will do exactly that. Thank you very much.
Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCaskill. Just a couple
more questions to get this on the record.
The size of the Amaranth position on the market and the significance for the market when the traders get to be that large, is that
a significant matter?
Mr. KAMINSKI. It is a very significant matter and Amaranth’s position were known to the market. The market knew about it. And
when I was watching the situation last year it was like watching
a train wreck in slow motion. It was obvious that it would end up
in a crash.
Senator LEVIN. Does it also affect future prices when someone
can dominate the market to that extent?
Mr. KAMINSKI. Absolutely.
Senator LEVIN. Professor Greenberger.
Mr. GREENBERGER. Absolutely. The futures markets, to the extent they are transparent, are used for price discovery. If you are
affecting them, these kind of trading affects the market. The collapse of Amaranth and the drop in natural gas, you do not have
to be a rocket scientist or have an algorithm to figure out why that
happened.
Senator LEVIN. To get a direct answer for the record, then the
size of the Amaranth trades affected future prices?
Mr. GREENBERGER. Absolutely.
Mr. KAMINSKI. Yes, it did.
Senator LEVIN. In terms of CFTC, does it pay to—end the Enron
loophole—close it, even with the current CFTC? Even if we cannot
do these kind of changes, we are not the people who appoint them
and whether or not they are confirmed is kind of a different issue,
and an important one. But is it worth pursuing and following the

VerDate 0ct 09 2002

14:27 Jan 25, 2008

Jkt 036616

PO 00000

Frm 00052

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

P:\DOCS\36616.TXT

SAFFAIRS

PsN: PAT

45
road that we are on, even if we cannot impact the makeup of the
CFTC?
Mr. GREENBERGER. I think it definitely is. I think that as captive
as it sometimes is, that the direction from Congress will have an
influence.
And also, the Commodity Exchange Act has a private right of action point in it. I say that hesitantly. I do not want to look to private lawsuits to protect these things. But if you put down these
mandates and all these malpractices are happening, Amaranth’s
lawyer was quick to point out there was no intent here, trying to
stay one step ahead of manipulation. I am not so sure that they
are one step ahead.
But yes, you definitely should do this. It is an easy fix. Alan
Greenspan would agree with you on it. He did not want this to
happen in 1999–2000. It should be fixed immediately.
Senator LEVIN. Do you agree with that Professor Kaminski?
Mr. KAMINSKI. I agree that removing the Enron exemption will
be very helpful. But at the same time, CFTC should be given more
firepower. It may be underfunded and understaffed currently.
I have been watching the energy markets not only in the United
States but also in other markets. And the common denominator is
complexity. This is what was mentioned a moment ago.
There were many cases of manipulation in other countries. The
regulators came. They looked at the complexity of the trades and
volume of the data and they threw their hands up in the air and
left. They did not have resources to investigate the issues.
Senator LEVIN. Senator Coleman.
Senator COLEMAN. Nothing. Thank you.
Senator LEVIN. Thank you both. You have been a tremendous
panel and we are very appreciative.
Let us now welcome our final witness for today’s hearing, Shane
Lee, who is a former natural gas trader at Amaranth, appearing
here today at Amaranth’s request, to answer questions about its
trading.
Let me just clarify what I just said, that even though Amaranth
is the one that selected Mr. Lee to represent them and to answer
questions today, we obviously are the ones that asked Amaranth to
identify a witness who could answer questions about its trading,
and Mr. Lee was identified by Amaranth as that person. Mr. Lee
worked at the Calgary office of Amaranth where the energy trading
was carried out.
Mr. Lee, we appreciate your being with us this morning. We welcome you to the Subcommittee. As you have heard, all witnesses
who testify before the Subcommittee are required to be sworn so
we would ask that you stand at this time and please raise your
right hand.
Do you swear that the testimony you will give before this Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you, God?
Mr. LEE. I do.
Senator LEVIN. We have that system there where that light will
go on a minute before the 5-minute mark, where we would hope
that you could keep your oral testimony to. And we, again, appreciate your coming here. We know that you are coming here volun-
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